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New settlement trust provisions in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 
have significant implications for Alaska Native Corporation (ANC) 
business longevity and the appropriateness of an operating business 
model given ANC goals as stated in their missions. The Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) authorized the creation of for-profit 
corporations for the benefit of Alaska Native shareholders. But for 
Alaska Natives, cultural continuation was and continues to be a 
desired goal. Considering the typical life span of U.S. corporations and 
the inevitability of eventual failure, the for-profit corporate model is 
inconsistent with aspects of the ANC mission. Settlement trust 
amendments to ANCSA facilitate ANC cultural continuation goals 
solving the problem of business viability risk. We make a normative 
case that ANCs should consider increasing endowment business 
activity. We also discuss the Alaska Permanent Fund and lessons that 
those structuring settlement trusts might learn from literature on 
sovereign wealth funds and endowments. 
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“In the long run, we are all dead.”  
John Maynard Keynes1 
“By the end of 2020, we will be publishing a 100 year plan that sets a 
foundation for future generations of Sealaska.”2 
I. ANCS’ DUAL MISSION 
What is the purpose of the Alaska Native Corporation (ANC)?3 For 
publicly traded corporations, a common maxim taught in MBA programs 
is to maximize shareholder wealth. Milton Friedman argued, “There is one 
and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and 
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays 
within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free 
competition without deception or fraud.”4 Under this rationale, 
companies’ first, best, and only goal should be to maximize shareholder 
wealth.5 The “mission statements” of companies often do not state 
“maximization of shareholder wealth” or profit maximization as an 
explicit goal. That is the goal from the perspective of economics. From the 
perspective of companies’ businesses, mission statements emphasize 
their companies’ products or services and where they fit into the 
marketplace, or how they serve customers. 
In the case of ANCs, virtually all boards and shareholders would 
agree that maximization of shareholder profit or wealth is not the only 
objective. Regional and village ANCs received title to large tracts of 
traditional lands as part of the settlement under the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA).6 ANCs want to retain their land and desire the 
cultural continuation that is part and parcel with the land protection 
 
 1.  JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (London, 
MacMillan & Co. 1924). 
 2.  Joe Nelson, Sealaska’s 2020 Vision and Message from Leadership, SEALASKA 
(Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.sealaska.com/shareholders/sealaskas-2020-vision-
and-message-from-leadership/. 
 3.  ANCs were formed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–29 
(2018)). Although the examples in this article are from regional ANCs, most of the 
discussion pertains equally to village corporations. 
 4.  Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its 
Profits, NY TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at *33. 
 5.  Id. Hansen and Lott have a somewhat different view where externalities 
cause shareholders to want to maximize portfolio value. Robert G. Hansen & John 
R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with Diversified 
Shareholder/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 43 (1989). 
 6.  Pub. L. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified in scattered chapters and 
sections of U.S.C.). 
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objective. This is reflected in a sampling of ANC annual reports, which 
often address management’s adherence to these goals in addition to 
financial success. Consider the mission statements of the twelve surviving 
regional ANCs.7 
Ahtna, Incorporated: Wise stewardship of Ahtna lands and 
responsible economic growth for future generations of Ahtna 
people. 
Aleut Corporation: To Maximize Dividends and Opportunities 
for Our Shareholders. 
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (ASRC): ASRC’s mission is 
to actively manage our businesses, our lands and resources, our 
investments, and our relationships to enhance Iñupiaq cultural 
and economic freedom - with continuity, responsibility, and 
integrity. 
Bering Straits Native Corporation (BSNC): Our mission is to 
improve the quality of life of our people through economic 
development while protecting our land and preserving our 
culture and heritage. 
Bristol Bay Native Corporation (BBNC): Our Mission: 
Enriching our Native way of life. Our Vision: To protect the 
land in the Bristol Bay region, celebrate the legacy of its people, 
and enhance the lives of BBNC shareholders. 
Calista Corporation: Increase Shareholder benefits and 
economic opportunities through innovation, growth, 
leadership, partnership, execution and financial discipline. 
Chugach Alaska Corporation: Committed to profitability, 
celebration of our heritage, and ownership of our Lands. 
Cook Inlet Region, Incorporated (CIRI): The mission of CIRI is 
to promote the economic and social well-being and Alaska 
Native heritage of our shareholders, now and into the future, 
through prudent stewardship of the company’s resources, 
while furthering self-sufficiency among CIRI shareholders and 
their families. 
Doyon, Limited: To continually enhance our position as a 
financially strong Native corporation in order to promote the 
economic and social well-being of our shareholders and future 
shareholders, to strengthen our Native way of life, and to 
protect and enhance our land and resources. 
Koniag, Incorporated: To achieve financial growth, honor our 
culture, protect our lands, advocate for our communities, and 
 
 7.  These were obtained from ANC’s websites in April 2021. We use the same 
name the regional corporation refers to for itself on its webpage as of 2021. This 
may be different than the corporate legal name. 
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make a meaningful impact on our Koniag family. 
NANA Regional Corporation: To improve the quality of life 
for our people by maximizing economic growth, protecting and 
enhancing our lands, and promoting healthy communities with 
decisions, actions, and behaviors inspired by our Iñupiat 
Ilitqusiat values consistent with our core principles. 
Sealaska Corporation: Sealaska’s purpose is to strengthen 
people, culture and homelands. We have strengthened business 
with culture since 1972. We are a Native institution owned by 
more than 22,000 shareholders whose core Native values guide 
all that Sealaska does and represent the rich heritage of the 
Tlingit, Haida and Tsimshian people. We are guided by values 
to build excellence in our Native enterprise and take action 
toward our purpose.  
These regional ANCs aim to achieve business, operational, and 
financial success in order to pay dividends, etc., but also emphasize the 
importance of the related goals of protection of lands and continuation of 
culture. These community focused goals are not typical in the usual for-
profit company mission statement. ANCs are unique in this regard. One 
commentator observes: 
A question like ‘I’m Doyon, what is your Native corporation?’ is 
now part of the Alaska Native terminology. These shareholders 
have a personal and emotional attachment to their corporation. 
They look to their ANC for job training and employment, 
scholarships, and burial assistance on top of their dividends. 
Shareholders within the same region, in many cases, have 
similar ethnicities, and cultural values. They may also speak 
their Indigenous language. Some may even characterize their 
collective body of shareholders as a nation state; a strange 
concept for those on the outside looking in on an ANC. Today’s 
Alaska Native shareholder may look to their ANC as part of 
their self-identity. The ANC, in some respects, has become a key 
identifier for the modern Alaska Native person.8 
One can think of the above discussion as dealing with “the why?” of 
ANCs. There are implications to this broader view of ANCs’ missions that 
ANCs regularly deal with in policy and business decisions. The following 
discusses “the how” by addressing two questions: 
 
1) Given the long-term goals of ANCs, is the typical lifespan of a 
 
 8.  Sharon Guenther Lind, Opening Enrollment: The Alaska Native Way, (Univ. 
of Alaska, Working Paper, 2015). 
OE - SNIGAROFFRICHARDS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2021  6:42 PM 
2021 ALASKA NATIVE CORP. ENDOWMENT MODELS 5 
corporation inconsistent with these cultural retention aims? 
2) If so, should ANCs consider other models? Specifically, is an 
operating business model or a settlement trust endowment 
model better suited to achieve these long-term goals? 
II. FUTURE ANC PROFIT AND DISTRIBUTIONS 
Alaska Native regional corporations have significantly grown in 
revenue, income, and number of shareholders over time.9 Anecdotally, 
the median and average regional corporation has grown more than the 
village corporations, but data for the latter are difficult to collect and we 
focus here on the regional corporations.10 The twelve regional ANCs have 
grown their equity to $4.3 billion.11 These twelve regional ANCs received 
$472,958,00012 of the approximately $1 billion settlement with Congress. 
The original distributions were paid out from 1973–1983.13 In their early 
 
 9.  See STEPHEN CORNELL ET AL., THE ECON. RESEARCH GRP, INC., 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ALASKA NATIVES COMMISSION REPORT B-3 (1999) 
(highlighting the population growth of Alaska’s Native populations); INST. OF SOC. 
AND ECON. RESEARCH, BENEFITS OF ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS AND THE SBA 
8(A) PROGRAM TO ALASKA NATIVES AND ALASKA 8 (2009) (discussing the increase in 
profitability over time of ANCs). 
 10.  We obtain our data from Sharon Guenther Lind, Alaska Pacific 
University. Lind hand-collected and kindly provided us individual ANC 
company financial reports and aggregated the proprietary data. The data on 
individual ANCs becomes available from their requirement to file with the State 
of Alaska. Although this information is public by law, for those ANCs meeting a 
minimum reporting threshold, ANC managements consider their detailed 
financial statement information proprietary and we do not reproduce a time series 
of detailed individual financial information here. We show aggregated 
profitability and 1982 and 2017 shareholder equity. The Alaska Securities Act 
requires corporations organized under ANCSA with 500 or more shareholders 
and over $1,000,000 in assets to file their annual reports, proxies, consents or 
authorizations, proxy statements, and other materials relating to proxy 
solicitations with the State of Alaska Division of Banking and Securities. ALASKA 
STAT. § 45.55.139 (2018). Shareholders of these ANCSA corporations are required 
to file proxy materials as well. Id. 
 11.  Sharon Guenther Lind, ALASKA NATIVE REGIONAL COMPANY PROPRIETARY 
DATASET (2019) [hereinafter Lind Dataset]. Much of the financial information 
reported herein on ANCs are aggregations from Lind’s dataset. Lind discusses 
her data in her dissertation. See generally Sharon Guenther Lind, Definitions of 
Success for Alaska Native Corporations (2019) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Alaska Fairbanks) (on file with author). Data here end in 2017. 
 12.  U.S DEP’T OF INTERIOR, ANCSA 1985 STUDY: ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS 
SETTLEMENT ACT (ANCSA) III-25 (1984). 
 13.  David Hoffman & Michael Orr, ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS ECONOMIC 
DATA 10 (2010); see generally Stephen Colt, Alaska Natives and the New Harpoon: 
Economic Performance of the ANCSA Regional Corporations, 25 J. LAND, RES. & ENVTL. 
L. 155 (2005). Stephen Colt also kindly provided data he collected for earlier 
periods ending around 1990. 
OE - SNIGAROFFRICHARDS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2021  6:42 PM 
6 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 38:1 
years, the ANCs experienced well-known and widely-documented 
growing pains.14 This is not surprising, given that the firms were funded 
via ANSCA provisions without clear ex-ante business rationales.15 It is 
likely that funding and distribution of shares to any widely disbursed 
rural population (or urban for that matter) would have fomented 
corporations that experienced general hardship—particularly in their 
early years. Quoting Alaska Native John Hope on this issue: “It’s like you 
and I never saw a baseball game in our lives. We’d never seen mitts or 
bats or baseballs. All of a sudden you were told, ‘Here’s your mitts. Here’s 
your bats. Here’s your balls. Tomorrow you play the Yankees.’”16 For 
these reasons we generally focus on 1982 and forward. 
  
Figure 1 compares the average profit margin for ANCSAs (the 
twelve regional corporations formed under ANCSA) to that for the S&P 
500 and the Russell 2000 Index. The Russell 2000 is an index of small 
company stocks and the average company in that index is more similar to 
 
 14.  See generally Jonathan M. Karpoff & Edward M. Rice, Organizational Form, 
Share Transferability, and Firm Performance: Evidence from the ANSCA Corporations, 
24 J. FIN. ECON. 69 (1989) (discussing the poor financial performance of ANCs in 
their first decade); Martha Hirschfield, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: 
Tribal Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 YALE L. J. 1331 (1991) (emphasizing 
financial and logistical difficulties that ANCs encountered despite Congressional 
amendment to ANSCA); Colt, supra note 13, at 155 (finding that between 1973 and 
1993, the regional corporations had lost “more than eighty percent of their original 
cash endowment”); Christian G. Vasquez, Note, A Business Entity by Any Other 
Name: Corporation, Community and Kinship, 33 ALASKA L. REV. 353, 360–61 (2016) 
(describing the significant initial implementation costs that ANCs incurred). 
 15.  ANCSA does not include strategic business or marketing plans. 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1606 (d) (2018). Alaska Natives had various individual plans, but mineral 
exploitation was expected to be important. William L. Hensley, Why the Natives 
of Alaska Have a Land Claim (Nov. 1969). 
 16.  Laurel Downing Bill, Statehood Ignites Land Rights Legal Battle, SENIOR 
VOICE (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://www.seniorvoicealaska.com/story/2017/12/01/columns/statehood-
ignites-land-rights-legal-battle/1552.html. 
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an ANC than is the S&P 500. ANCs are more profitable than the average 
Russell 2000 company. That is a useful indicator, but it is not the best 
indication of results for long term success for companies. A better 
indication is the change in value for the company. However, shares in 
ANCs are not marketable,17 hence we will look at their long-term 
accumulation of equity and compare that to index changes. 
Table 1. Regional ANC Shareholders’ Equity 
Thousands of Dollars 
  1982 2017 
Ahtna, Incorporated 17,754 30,195,662 
Aleut Corporation 16,611 158,179,460 
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation 20,002 1,620,909,000 
Bering Straits Native Corporation 4,953 105,292,188 
Bristol Bay Native Corporation 34,360 396,894,000 
Calista Corporation 54,717 229,548,229 
Chugach Alaska Corporation 16,575 309,435,485 
Cook Inlet Region, Incorporated 75,880 668,665,000 
Doyon, Limited 57,991 372,343,000 
Koniag, Incorporated 1,504 87,311,000 
NANA Regional Corporation, Inc. 44,669 66,760,000 
Sealaska Corporation 176,000 277,829,000 
Average Equity 43,418 360,280,169 
Summed Equity 521,016 4,323,362,024 
Apparent different equity growth rates between ANCs do not 
include the payment of dividends, scholarships, shareholder 
employment, or other possible benefits to shareholders. 
 
 Table 1 compares the shareholder equity amounts for the twelve 
regional corporations in 1982 and 2017.18 Their combined value in 2017 
was $4.3 billion, which equates to a gain of more than eight times their 
combined value in 1972. Over this same period, the price gain (without 
 
 17.  Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA), Pub. L. No. 92-
203, §§ 7 (i)–(j), 85 Stat. 688, 693 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606(h)(1)(B)(i)–(vi) 
(2018)). 
 18.  See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 12, at V-44–84 (showing the data 
displayed for 1982 in the Table). Note that at V-35 is a summary with mixed 1982 
and 1983 data. Id. at V-35. The 2017 data is from Lind, supra note 11. 
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dividends) of the S&P 500 was approximately eighteen-fold.19 Small 
corporations, as indexed by the Russell 2000, saw gains of nearly sixteen 
and a half-fold during that time.20 However, from 2004 to 2017,21 ANCs’ 
average dividend payout ratio (dividends paid divided by net income) 
had been sixty-eight percent, which is higher than the forty-nine percent 
payout for the S&P 500 over the same period.22 For several years within 
this timeframe, total payout ratios for all ANCs exceeded one-hundred 
percent of their net income.23 However, from the perspective of stock 
investors these stock index gains were pre-tax24 and ANCs, which are 
taxable at federal and state levels,25 could not have achieved these pre-tax 
index gains. But these levels of pre-tax gains are important when 
considering the future—ANCs now can invest at near tax-exempt status, 
as pension funds and endowments do. Shareholders also received 
dividends and other benefits.26 Although these gains differ between 
ANCs, the apparent rate of growth for the individual corporations should 
not be directly used as a measure of the individual successes of different 
ANCs in achieving their goals. Individual ANCs are shown to provide a 
magnitude of their economic activity and demonstrate that outcomes 
vary widely. 
From 2004 to 2017, regional ANC dividends per share averaged 
about $16.98, or $1,698 per 100 shares (the original number of shares 
 
 19.  Online Data Robert Shiller, YALE UNIV. DEP’T OF ECON.: HOME PAGE OF 
ROBERT J. SHILLER, http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm (last visited Jan. 
30, 2020) [hereinafter Shiller Data]. 
 20.  Id. In 1981, Banz inaugurated the size premium literature, arguing that 
small stocks contain a return premium relative to large ones. Rolf W. Banz, The 
Relationship Between Return and Market Value of Common Stocks, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 16 
(1981). Its failure to manifest after his and other researchers’ publications is well-
known in the financial economics literature. See, e.g., G. WILLIAM SCHWERT, 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 939–74 (1st ed. 2003). 
 21.  Lind’s detailed data starts in 2004. 
 22.  Shiller Data, supra note 19. 
 23.  Id. This magnitude of payout is facilitated by factors unique to ANCs and 
are beyond the scope of this article. S&P 500 companies have paid out more than 
one-hundred percent of earnings in dividends, seven of one-hundred and forty-
eight times (five percent) since 1871, once during 2004 to 2017 (during the 2008 
crisis), while ANCs have done so three times (fourteen percent) from 2004 to 2017. 
Id. 
 24.  The companies that make up the indexes are taxed, but ANCs’ 
opportunity costs after tax law changes are endowment-like payouts. See infra 
Section 1.6. 
 25.  See, e.g., JANA PEIRCE ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ALASKA NATIVE 
ORGANIZATIONS ON INTERIOR ALASKA 13 (2008) (detailing the federal tax burden 
that an ANC incurred in 2006). 
 26.  This is why the price gain for the indexes are mentioned, and not a total 
return. A total return calculation includes dividends received and reinvested in 
the index, which would be an inaccurate comparison to the changes in book equity 
for ANCs, which are more closely related to an index price gain. 
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distributed to each eligible shareholder),27 which equates to about three-
and-a-half percent of average per capita annual income in Alaska of 
$49,284 over those same fourteen years.28 Using this data, we have 
forecasted the growth of earnings and dividends out 100 years with 
various population and earnings growth assumptions and found that the 
average ANC will never be able to exclusively support shareholders’ 
income. The economic impact of dividends is—and will always be—
ancillary to shareholders’ other earnings. Still, for many, especially village 
shareholders, dividends are a material amount. We experimented with 
many growth scenarios, and ANC shareholders may be able to receive 
dividends that provide a similar low single digit magnitude of per capita 
income.29 It will be less if ANCs open enrollment to shareholders born 
after 1971—an option offered with later amendments that many ANCs 
utilized.30 It is a testament to the importance of cultural continuation that 
existing shareholders are willing to endure material dilution to bring in 
new shareholders born after the original 1971 cutoff date when they elect 
to conduct open enrollment. But there is a glaring problem with assuming 
dividends will continue—it assumes the continued business viability of 
ANCs. 
III. RISK OF ACHIEVING THE CULTURAL CONTINUATION GOAL 
As outlined earlier, ANCs have embraced cultural continuation as a 
crucial reason for their existence. To more fully answer how this goal is 
best achieved, we now discuss the question—is the operating business 
model the best way to achieve the cultural continuation goal? To answer 
that correctly we need to first consider a different question—how risky 
are ANSCA firms? 
 
 27.  43 U.S.C. § 1606(g)(1)(A) (2018). 
 28.  Lind, supra note 11; Per Capita Personal Income in Alaska, FRED ECON. 
DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AKPCPI (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 29.  Modeling this involves a fairly complex forecast of shareholder 
population, ANC firm open enrollment assumptions, and per capita and business 
growth. Population growth models involve differential equations but for our 
purposes a simple thought experiment suffices: which grows faster; the 
shareholder population (additional distributions make the population grow 
more), or the ANC companies net of their survival rates? Depending on one’s 
assumptions, one can defend either. However, Hendrik Bessembinder shows a 
given set of firms tends to be fairly short lived, hence if shareholder population 
grows dividends from firms will tend to shrink. See Hendrik Bessembinder, Do 
Stocks Outperform Treasury Bills?, 129 J. FIN. ECON. 440 (2018). 
 30.  Alex DeMarban, After Calista Vote, Descendant Dilemma Looms for Alaska 
Native Corporations, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (July 19, 2015), 
https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/article/question-enrolling-descendants-
nags-corporations-after-calistas-expansion/2015/07/20/. 
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In finance theory, risk is broken into two parts, market risk and going 
concern risk.31 Market risk is that which is common to all companies.32 All 
companies are exposed to macro-economic or aggregate risk that impacts 
the earnings for all companies and even government entities. This risk 
cannot be diversified away by owning a lot of different kinds of 
businesses or bonds in many different sovereign states.33 It can only be 
diversified away by transferring anywhere from zero to one-hundred 
percent of a company’s holdings into a risk-free asset. Such risk-free assets 
exist only in theory and in any case, there is little reward for a company 
holding only risk-free assets.34 A risk-free proxy of Treasury bills has 
historically only matched inflation in terms of generating return.35 Hence, 
a business or an investor is lucky to keep up with inflation by trying to 
avoid all risk. Businesses need to assume some degree of risk to grow their 
equity more than inflation. 
Of course, businesses do not primarily invest in government bonds. 
They also are not usually holding companies comprised of many other 
companies. They willingly assume risk in conducting their own unique 
activities. In the case of ANCs, they assume the same overall market risk 
as all other companies, but each also has its own particular going concern 
risk. Unfortunately, the natural life cycle of businesses includes death. 
 
 31.  In the financial economics literature, the terminology generally used for 
“market risk” and “going concern risk” are “systematic risk” and “idiosyncratic 
or unsystematic risk.” See William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market 
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 436 (1964) (discussing 
systematic and unsystematic risk). These have formal definitions, but the common 
language terms used here work for our purposes. Id. This theory of asset prices 
helped Sharpe win the 1990 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. More 
complicated factor models have been proposed that include other risks. See, e.g., 
Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing 
Anomalies, 51 J. FIN. 55 (1996) (introducing a three-factor model to capture capital 
asset pricing model average-return anomalies). Relevant to ANCs’ non-tradability 
(illiquidity) of shares is the risk model of Robert G. Snigaroff and David 
Wroblewski. Robert G. Snigaroff & David Wroblewski, An Earnings, Liquidity, and 
Market Model, 50 APPLIED ECON. 6220 (2018). This model of risk differentiates 
liquidity from earnings related risk. Id. 
 32.  James Chen, Market Risk, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketrisk.asp (last updated Jan. 31, 
2020). Popular internet sites often have inaccurate or not current explanations of 
standard investment theory, but the entries we cite herein are consistent with 
standard investment theory and are useful here. 
 33.  For an overview of standard investment theory, see generally BODIE, Z ET 
AL., INVESTMENTS (4th ed. 1999). 
 34.  See id. at 181 (providing an overview of the idea of a “risk-free asset” and 
using Treasury bills as a proxy). 
 35.  See Shiller Data, supra note 19. The geometric mean of the “One-Year 
Interest Rate” is 1.046 and “Consumer Price Index” is 1.046; they have the same 
rate of growth of 4.6%. 
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Businesses routinely go out of business.36 The risk to each individual 
company is their going concern risk (or idiosyncratic risk).37 It is risk that 
is intrinsic to the company and cannot be diversified away by the 
company itself, even if the company is itself diversified across several 
business lines. Even though some ANC shareholders and mangers have 
experienced bankruptcy,38 many shareholders do not fully realize the 
significance of this risk. Casual observers sometimes believe that market 
risk is as great as or greater than individual businesses’ going concern 
risk. But each business has a high degree of market risk embedded into 
its overall risk—even if the business is a privately owned company.39 
To appreciate the difference, consider the expected life cycle of an 
individual business and compare it to the life cycle of an entire stock 
market or economy. Businesses’ lives are typically measured in years or 
decades while stock markets can last centuries.40 With respect to going 
concern risk, every single ANC company will suffer some kind of 
bankruptcy or discontinuation. This has nothing to do with ANCs being 
inferior to other corporations. All companies discontinue, die, or merge; 
that is the nature of business. It is simply a question of how long they can 
survive before succumbing to going concern risk. The 7(i) distributions41 
 
 36.  See Small Business Statistics, CHAMBER OF COM., 
https://www.chamberofcommerce.org/small-business-statistics/ (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2021) (noting approximately 20% of small businesses fail in their first 
year). 
 37.  “Substantial doubt about an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern 
exists when relevant conditions and events, considered in the aggregate, indicate 
that it is probable that the entity will be unable to meet its obligations as they 
become due within one year . . . .” FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., 
PRESENTATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS– GOING CONCERN 2 (2014). We relate the 
accounting “going concern” principal of a business being able to continue, to the 
financial economic term of “unsystematic” or “idiosyncratic” risk. Both refer to 
the risk of a particular business. We adopt the more common language term 
“going concern” risk. Id. 
 38.  Mark Baumgartner, Alaska’s Natives Getting Hard Lesson in Modern 
Business. Regional Corporations Run into Financial Difficulties, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Apr. 21, 1986), 
https://www.csmonitor.com/1986/0421/adire.html#:~:text=In%20filing%20for
%20bankruptcy%20protection,are%20Bering%20Straits’s%20major%20creditors. 
 39.  Bodie, Z., Kane, A. and Marcus, A.J., 1996. Investments, Irwin series in 
Finance. 
 40.  The beginnings of the U.S. stock market in the 18th century are covered 
in popular literature. See generally, 
EDWARD F. MCQUARRIE, THE FIRST 50 YEARS OF THE US STOCK MARKET: NEW 
EVIDENCE ON INVESTOR TOTAL RETURN INCLUDING DIVIDENDS 1793–1843 (2018). 
 41.  This is a normative policy word, hence throughout we use the term 
commonly used today by ANC managements and shareholders. They refer to 
“7(i)” distributions from ANCSA. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified 
at 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i)(1)(A) (2018)). 
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and risk pooling42 reduce but do not eliminate this risk. While ANCs have 
such special provisions of revenue sharing amongst themselves, 
discussed later,43 they are not immune to the life cycle of business. 
Is cultural continuation consistent with a business life cycle that is 
typically measured in decades? Some businesses last longer, but those are 
rare. As a simple example, of the original S&P 500 companies in the 1957 
formation of the S&P 500 Index, most are no longer in existence.44 
Bessembinder finds that the median time that stocks are listed in the 
Center for Research in Security Prices from 1926 to 2015 is about seven 
years.45 Bessembinder also runs simulations where he draws a single 
stock randomly from the universe of stocks through time and on average 
most have a lower rate of return than the risk-free rate.46 The apparent 
discrepancy of high long-term stock index returns with low individual 
average stocks’ failure to keep up with inflation, is that the distribution of 
individual returns is highly skewed; a few important winners make up a 
large share of the return of the stock market.47 The vast majority of stocks 
are delisted or have middling performance.48 And these are companies 
that are on average much larger and less risky in terms of continuation 
risk than ANCs.49 It is important for shareholders to understand how high 
the actual ANC going concern (continuation) risk is. 
Of the original thirteen regional ANCs, only one has ceased 
operations—The 13th Regional Corporation.50 However, some of the other 
twelve have undergone bankruptcy reorganizations.51 While some ANC 
regionals have filed for bankruptcy, they have been able to reorganize and 
reopen business operations.52 But that is not a given. Unlike The 13th 
 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See infra Part V. 
 44.  In 2007, eighty-six of the original companies from 1957 were still on the 
list. Fred Schneyer, 86 Companies in the S&P 500 Since the Start, Plansponsor (Mar. 
2, 2007), https://www.plansponsor.com/86-companies-in-the-sp-500-since-the-
start/. 
 45.  Bessembinder, supra note 29, at 441 (2018). Craig Doidge find the average 
age for public companies has grown in recent years, to twenty years, but most of 
these companies are far larger than ANCs. Craig Doidge et al., Eclipse of the Public 
Corporation or Eclipse of the Public Markets?, 30 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 11 (2018). 
 46.  Bessembinder, supra note 29, at 456. 
 47.  Id. at 442. 
 48.  Id. at 441. 
 49.  Compare id., with supra Section 1.2, Fig. 1. 
 50.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-121, REGIONAL ALASKA 
NATIVE CORPORATIONS: STATUS 40 YEARS AFTER ESTABLISHMENT, AND FUTURE 
CONSIDERATIONS 11 (2012) (noting that The 13th Regional Corporation became 
insolvent in 2007). 
 51.  Kathryn A. Black et al., When Worlds Collide: Alaska Native Corporations and 
the Bankruptcy Code, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 73, 75 nn.5 & 6 (1989). 
 52.  Baumgartner, supra note 38. 
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Regional Corporation, a bankrupt ANC has a better chance at 
reorganization, as they can conceivably monetize in some way their 
landholdings and 7(i) distributions from other regional ANCs.53 Even if 
an ANC files for bankruptcy, it may well be able to eventually reorganize 
and obtain capital to finance natural resource exploitation, for example 
(legal ANC landholding issues are complex).54 While it is a possibility that 
ANCs may be able to operate for long periods in a cycle of business 
demise and rebirth, the degree of economic benefit and the ability to foster 
cultural goals while operating in or near bankruptcy is certainly 
diminished. Although ANCs have obtained some unusual provisions that 
helps them continue to achieve economic success,55 these will not always 
be available. As a group, ANCs have experienced success in their political 
and lobbying efforts.56 But so have other large companies, and these other 
large companies still eventually cease operations or merge.57 Lobbying 
success does not and will not ensure continued ANC business viability. 
Eventually, all companies—including ANCs—will cease to be. An 
attempt to address this ANC going concern issue has been the 
amendments to ANCSA involving settlement trusts.58 Before discussion 
of that, however, it is useful to understand more about endowment 
models, why they exist and their potential applicability to ANCs. 
 
 53.  43 U.S.C. § 1606(1)(A) (2018). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  For examples of critical coverage of ANC business practice, see Robert 
O’Harrow, Washington Post Investigations: Two Worlds: Government Contractors, 
Alaska Natives, WASH POST (Sept 20, 2010), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/nation/alaska-native/. For 
arguments concerning a legal revamping of Section 8(a) for which ANCs derive 
large parts of their revenues, see Jenny J. Yang, Small Business, Rising Giant: Policies 
and Costs of Section 8(a) Contracting Preferences for Alaska Native Corporations, 23 
ALASKA L. REV. 315 (2006). 
 56.  An example of this is Senator Lisa Murkowski’s reelection campaign of 
2010. See Richard Mauer, Natives’ super PAC Meant New Boost for Murkowski 
Campaign, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Nov. 20, 2010), 
https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/article/natives-super-pac-meant-new-
boost-murkowski-campaign/2010/11/21/k (“If Sen. Lisa Murkowski’s re-
election survives her opponent’s challenges, she will in no small measure owe her 
historic write-in victory to . . . massive Native corporation spending on her 
behalf.”); Yereth Rosen, Senator Lisa Murkowski Wins Alaska Write-in Campaign, 
REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2010), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-elections-
murkowski-idUSTRE6AG51C20101118. 
 57.  See Bessembinder, supra note 29, at 451 (noting that common stocks in 
CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) exist for 7.5 years on average). 
 58.  43 U.S.C. § 1629e (2018). 
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IV. AN ENDOWMENT MODEL 
Some cultures last millennia.59 As stated in their mission statements, 
ANCs want to be involved in cultural continuation. How, then, can ANCs 
match the cultural life cycle with the institutions that house their 
corporate economic activity? To answer that, consider the kinds of 
institutions that last longer than businesses. Countries have life cycles that 
can span centuries or millennia. But ANSCA was an act that abrogated 
claims to Alaska Native sovereignty, at least with respect to the operation 
of ANCs including the traditional lands they own and manage.60 
Universities are another type of institution that has a long life cycle. 
Universities can last centuries, even millennia,61 and they have done so 
within different political environments and polities. While many may 
experience difficulty in the future given demographics and new 
educational delivery technology,62 those that have endowments are far 
more secure.63 Indeed, an important reason why some individual 
universities can survive so long is because they have set up endowments 
that fund large portions of their mission.64 Endowments can also 
conceivably can last centuries.65 Endowments pay out a portion of their 
 
 59.  See Inuit Culture, VIRTUAL MUSEUM CAN., 
http://www.virtualmuseum.ca/edu/ViewLoitLo.do?method=preview&lang=E
N&id=10641 (last visited Jan. 29, 2021) (noting that Canadian Inuit have a 5,000 
year cultural heritage). 
 60.  See THOMAS R. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA 
NATIVE REVIEW COMMISSION (1985) for an account of ANCSA’s passage and for far 
reaching amendment proposals. See generally DONALD CRAIG MITCHELL, TAKE MY 
LAND, TAKE MY LIFE: THE STORY OF CONGRESS’S HISTORIC SETTLEMENT OF ALASKA 
NATIVE LAND CLAIMS, 1960–1971 (2001); WILLIAM L. IGGIAGRUK HENSLEY, FIFTY 
MILES FROM TOMORROW: A MEMOIR OF ALASKA AND THE REAL PEOPLE (2009). 
 61.  Bologna University is often regarded as the oldest continuously operating 
university, and “1088 is conventionally taken as [Bologna University’s] year of 
birth.” NURIA SANZ & SJUR BERGAN, THE HERITAGE OF EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIES 131 
(1st ed. 2002). 
 62.  Graeme Wood, The Future of College?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/09/the-future-of-
college/375071/. 
 63.  Sarah Butrymowicz, The Hechinger Report, and Pete D’Amato, A Crisis is 
Looming for U.S. Colleges—and Not Just Because of the Pandemic, NBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 
2020, 7:02 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/education/crisis-looming-u-
s-colleges-not-just-because-pandemic-n1235338. 
 64.  See id. (noting that colleges with stronger endowments are more 
financially stable). 
 65.  For a good overview of endowment investing, see generally Josh Lerner, 
Antoinette Schoar, and Jialan Wang, Secrets of the Academy: The Drivers of 
University Endowment Success, 22 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 207 (2008). Although 
endowments are generally thought to be of lower risk than individual companies 
as discussed, they too have risk. See, e.g., Philip H. Dybvig & Zhenjiang Qin, How 
to Squander Your Endowment: Pitfalls and Remedies, 
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earnings to fund their given mission, ideally after provision for inflation.66 
They are tax advantaged.67 Endowments do assume market risk; their 
investments are not in risk-free assets as those only match inflation and 
would not provide any funding without corpus erosion.68 Instead, they 
hold widely diversified portfolios of assets in the worldwide portfolio of 
investable assets and hence are shielded from the going concern risk 
failure of individual businesses.69 
A close to home example that ANCs should look to is the 
tremendously successful Alaska Permanent Fund (APF), which is 
managed by the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC). Why is the 
APF so successful? The primary success does not arise from the 
investments the fund has made. APFC has made wise investments, but 
no wiser than the average endowment or institutional pension fund.70 
Indeed, being too clever in investments can be unwise, as it often means 
the assumption of too much going concern risk. The major risk that APFC 
has to date successfully mitigated is very real, and very dangerous—
political risk and political investment that destroys value. APFC’s true 
success lies in a constitutionally grounded governance structure, and the 
behavior of the APFC and Alaska policy makers understanding and 
managing this risk. 
V. POLITICAL INVESTMENT, RENT SEEKING, AND AGENCY ISSUES 
Before the formation of the APF, Alaska politicians, in connection 
with business leaders, undertook several projects that promised jobs to 
Alaskan residents.71 However, a number of these became well-publicized 
failures.72 It is common for politicians’ platforms to include job creation 
plans and job creating investments.73 These investments have high 
 
https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-
bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2016&paper_id=616 (presented at 
the 2016 American Finance Association Annual Meeting, Jan. 3–5). 
 66.  Brian O’Connell, What is an Endowment and How are They Structured?, THE 
STREET (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:54 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/what-is-
an-endowment-14894094. 
 67.  William M. Gentry, Debt, Investment and Endowment Accumulation: The 
Case of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 845, 849 (2002). 
 68.  Id. at 851. 
 69.  See id. at 852–53 (discussing how hospital endowments balance risk). 
 70.  For an evaluation of the APFC in a global context, see generally APFC, A 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: ANNUAL REPORT 2018, 
https://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/annual-reports/2018-APFC-
Annual-Report.pdf. 
 71.  JOHN STROHMEYER, EXTREME CONDITIONS: BIG OIL AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF ALASKA 110–22 (1993). 
 72.  Id. at 99-109. 
 73.  Adam Davidson, Can Anyone Really Create Jobs?, NY TIMES MAG.: IT’S THE 
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idiosyncratic risk, as each investment has unique risk associated with 
each project. It does a politician no political good to create an undefined 
number of jobs somewhere in the world, which is what an investor is 
effectively promoting when making diversified investments in the 
worldwide portfolio, when they can point to jobs created “here, at home,” 
where the voters are located. Even if the politician supports or proposes 
numerous projects, their aggregated going concern risk is still much 
higher than if investments are spread across the world as is done in a 
typical endowment, such as the APF.74 
To understand how dangerous this kind of political investment can 
be for a company’s longevity, consider an ANC regional or village 
corporation with a $158 million book value: the equity value for the Aleut 
Corporation at the end of 2017.75 This level of book equity is smaller than 
average for an ANC regional, but larger than most ANC village 
corporations.76 If Aleut made a job promoting venture and paid an annual 
salary of $50,000 to each employee in the venture, this implies 3,164 job 
years. Coincidentally, this is about the number of Aleut Corporation 
original shareholders. Aleut could employ every shareholder for a year, 
and if the venture did not generate revenue, would then be out of capital. 
Suppose the venture required 10% of Aleut’s shareholders, say 316 
employees. Those could be employed for ten years before the capital was 
completely depleted. Of course, the venture could make money such that 
the employees could be employed longer. However, a rule of thumb for 
new ventures is 80% of them fail within five years.77 Hence, the more 
likely outcome would be Aleut would spend all of its book value to 
employ several hundred employees and the venture would fail before ten 
years. Making investments simply to promote job creation is dangerous 
to long-term firm continuation and inconsistent with a goal of long-term 
cultural continuation. This is why ANC company managements have 
been careful about pursuing ventures to promote jobs.78 Although board 
 
ECONOMY (Nov. 3, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/magazine/job-creation-campaign-
promises.html. 
 74.  Diversified companies still have higher risk than the overall worldwide 
market. See BODIE, Z ET AL., supra note 33, at 202. 
 75.  Aleut Corporation 2017 Annual Report 25. 
 76.  This example assumes that Aleut would be able to sell all of its other 
investments for a net amount equal to its book value. 
 77.  This rule of thumb was offered by the founding leader of a southern 
California venture capital firm in personal conversation. Interview with George 
Kenney, founder and Managing Director, Shepherd Ventures. Venture capital 
backed firms are generally riskier than public firms, hence this estimate is roughly 
consistent with Bessembinder. See Bessembinder, supra note 29, at 451 (noting that 
the median existence for a common stock in CRSP is 7.5 years). 
 78.  See ANCSA REGIONAL ASS’N, 2017 ECONOMIC REPORT 8 (2017), 
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candidate statements sometimes feature a “jobs for shareholders 
platform,”79 a better approach, in terms of longevity of the firm, is first to 
find ventures with economic rationale then secondarily having 
“shareholder preference” in hiring.80 This is the practice of most ANC 
regional corporations.81 
This kind of politically motivated investment activity is one 
problem. More insidious are the problems that economists refer to as 
“rent seeking”82 and “agency issues.”83 Rent seeking occurs when a hired 
agent works for the best interest of themselves but does not add net 
economic value.84 As an example, a manager at an ANC may be more 
interested in maintaining a paying position than in bettering their 
shareholders’ economic or cultural outcome. Whereas rent seeking is 
usually for the more obvious benefit of self-enrichment, agency issues are 
not always clear. Agency issues occur when a hired agent—or agents—
are conflicted, meaning they do not work solely for the benefit of the 
entity that has hired them.85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://ancsaregional.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2017-ANCSA-
Economic-Impact-Report.pdf. 
 79.  See, e.g., Independent Candidates, SEALASAKA, 
https://mysealaska.com/Election/IndependentCandidates. 
 80.  For a case history of shareholder hire, see Haley, S., et al., Indigenous 
employment, training and retention: successes and challenges at Red Dog Mine, in 
NATURAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION AND INDIGENOUS LIVELIHOODS: DEVELOPMENT 
CHALLENGES IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 24 (2014) (“There are not enough jobs at 
Red Dog for every shareholder that applies.”). 
 81.  The introductory message of the most recent ANCSA Regional 
Association economic report indicates the relative priorities: “Ours is a story of 
long-term equity growth and of providing stable and very real economic benefit 
to our shareholders through the dividends we provide, the scholarships we invest 
in to develop our shareholders’ futures, and the investments we make in a wide 
variety of cultural and social non-profit organizations that benefit our 
shareholders.” ANCSA REGIONAL ASS’N, supra note 78, at 4. Jobs for shareholders 
and non-shareholders are not mentioned until page five. Id. at 5. 
 82.  For a well-known paper that discusses rent seeking’s hindrance of 
economic growth, see generally Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 409 (1993). 
 83.  For a good overview of principal agency issues, see generally David E.M. 
Sappington, Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 45 (1991). 
 84.  ECONOMIC TIMES, Definition of “Rent Seeking,” (last accessed Feb. 27, 2021), 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/rent-seeking. 
 85.  See Sappington, supra note 83, at 45 (highlighting the concern of how to 
encourage the agent to perform as the principal desires in light of the costs of 
monitoring). 
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Table 2. Ownership of Top Ten Shareholders (Based on Original 
Distribution) 
For ANCs, shareholder ownership is diffuse. While ownership 
figures for ANCs are kept private, we know that in 1972 shares were 
evenly distributed across individuals and can impute the percentage 
ownership, then, for the top ten holders.86 The average across all ANCs 
has the top ten holders owning 0.16% of all shares. These figures have 
changed as some shareholders have died and willed their shares to other 
existing shareholders. However, despite these changes, ANCs still have 
highly diffuse ownership.87 Also, for ANCs, ownership is exclusively held 
by individuals; not institutions (holding companies, investment advisors, 
etc.).88 This means that elections of the board of directors can look more 
like a political campaign than is typical at U.S.  
publicly traded firms.89 The board of directors of a regional ANC, who are 
interested in getting elected or reelected, may cause the regional company 
to act in the best interest of a certain village if that village is particularly 
influential in the elections.90 Although this may be a subconscious 
 
 86.  43 U.S.C. § 1605(c) (2018). 
 87.  See, e.g., Our Corporation, CIRI, https://www.ciri.com/our-corporation/ 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2021) (noting that CIRI is owned by over 9,100 shareholders). 
 88.  43 U.S.C. § 1606(h) (2018). 
 89.  See generally Jonathan M. Karpoff & Edward M. Rice, Organizational Form, 
Share Transferability, and Firm Performance: Evidence from the ANCSA Corporations, 
24 J. FIN. ECON. 69 (1989); Colt, supra note 13. 
 90.  When one of the authors was a Board member of an ANC, he observed 
this tendency in some board members. We all exhibit bias; the goal is to be aware 
of, minimize, and manage agency problems. 
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tendency, this “agency problem” can have very real consequences. For 
one thing, it is often difficult for shareholders to unseat a board member 
or slate of board members who are overseeing a poorly performing 
ANC.91 
Further, the complicated property rights of ANCSA, which 
established the ANCs, also created additional agency issues that made 
business start-up more problematic for ANCs than is typical for start-up 
corporations. For ANCs, one corporation controls the subsurface rights of 
another corporation’s lands.92 Further, 7(i) distributions require ANC 
regionals to distribute seventy percent of their natural resource revenues 
to other regionals and then fifty percent of that revenue is distributed to 
the village corporations.93 These provisions may have been included to 
improve the chances of success for all ANCs if natural resources were 
found and extracted on a particular ANCs lands, mitigate overall risk, 
and encourage collaboration between Native groups.94 However, this 
system of property rights is unusual and has not always been easy to 
delineate, a fact that led to many expensive and polarizing lawsuits.95 
Studies such as Karpoff and Rice (1989)96 that compare the performance 
of the thirteen ANCs’ performance to public companies do not factor in 
this special problem—an unintentional bias that factors against ANCs. 
The APF endowment, on the other hand, has, through its political 
monitoring and legal structure and fund management, mitigated the risks 
of rent seeking, political investment, and agency issues.97 The fund and 
 
 91.  For Alaska Native regional board election examples, see Sharon Guenther 
Lind, Definitions of Success for Alaska Native Corporations 135–39 (2019) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alaska Fairbanks) (on file with the 
UAF Rasmuson & Mather Libraries, University of Alaska Fairbanks). 
 92.  43 U.S.C. §§ 1606(i)(1)(A), (j) (2018). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  See About the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, ANSCA REGIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, https://ancsaregional.com/about-ancsa/ (explaining the history 
under the section header “The Revenue Sharing Provisions of ANCSA: Sections 
7(i) and 7(j)”). 
 95.  Author Robert Snigaroff was a board member of the Aleut Corporation 
in 1987 when ANCs were engaged in expensive, protracted litigation with other 
regional corporations over § 7 disputes. Since the adoption of ANCSA there have 
been several large and contentious lawsuits or arbitrations around how revenue 
sharing works between ANCs, including one ongoing dispute, in which author 
Craig Richards represents one of the claimants, related to whether revenues 
generated from the sale of carbon credit offsets are sharable. See generally Ethan 
G. Schutt & Aaron M. Schutt, The Grand Compromise: The ANCSA Section 7(i) 
Settlement Agreement, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 201 (2017); Aaron M. Schutt, ANCSA 
Section 7(i): 40 Million Per Word And Counting, 33 ALASKA L. REV. 229 (2016). 
 96.  See generally Jonathan M. Karpoff & Edward M. Rice, Organizational Form, 
Share Transferability, and Firm Performance: Evidence from the ANCSA Corporations, 
24 J. FIN. ECON. 69 (1989). 
 97.  Some argue the fund, or at least the legislative policy of paying individual 
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its regular dividend distribution have created a cliental or constituency 
effect that encourages close monitoring of the fund by state citizens.98 
State politicians take political risk by suggesting use of the fund to pay for 
things other than dividends. Political and fund management officials are 
carefully watched and so act as careful agents for the health of the fund.99 
The APF state endowment structure helps successfully manage the 
agency risk. APFC fund managers’ sole mission is to invest the fund to 
maximize the return given reasonable amounts of market risk so 
dividends can be maintained.100 It is the case that fund managers want to 
have healthy careers,101 but it is difficult for a “rent seeking” fund official 
to grow a business empire to the detriment of the health of the fund. The 
legal governance structure minimizes rent seeking risk, and, in the 
substantial experience of the Authors, APFC fund officials have been 
conscientious professionals. Finally, the fund invests in the worldwide 
pool of assets, thus eliminating going concern risk. So long as there is 
economic growth throughout the world, and so long as the fund is not 
used to fund government at unsustainable levels or is expropriated,102 the 
fund will not “go out of business.” 
ANCs have observed the beneficial APF endowment and in some 
cases have set up investment pools that even use the name “permanent 
fund.”103 However, the ANC permanent funds have usually remained 
 
Alaskans a dividend out of APF earnings, was unfortunate policy. We take no 
stance here on the contentious dividend issue, but we offer discussion on how a 
state endowment affects the management of agency issues. For an argument 
concerning fund agency issues, see generally Robert G. Snigaroff, The Economics 
of Active Management, 26 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 16 (2000). 
 98.  See DAVE ROSE, SAVING FOR THE FUTURE: MY LIFE AND THE ALASKA 
PERMANENT FUND 166-168 (2008). 
 99.  See, e.g., Dan Kaufman, Why Alaskans are trying to recall their Governor, THE 
NEW YORKER (Mar. 5, 2020) https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/why-
alaskans-are-trying-to-recall-their-governor (explaining that the recall effort is in 
part motivated by accusations of the Permanent Fund’s mismanagement). 
 100.  The Board of Trustees, ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., 
https://apfc.org/the-board-of-trustees/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). Alaska law 
does require the board to invest APF assets in in-state investments, but only to the 
extent that in-state investments are available and have a risk level and expected 
return comparable to alternative investment opportunities. ALASKA STAT. § 
37.13.120(c) (2018). 
 101.  One of the authors was a former employee at, and another is a current 
Trustee of the Board of, APFC. 
 102.  Expropriation can take a number of forms besides unstable use of the 
fund by the Government of the State of Alaska, e.g., the U.S. Federal Government 
can change tax treatment for the endowment. Of course, the risk of political 
investment is always a real risk that Alaska State law, APFC management, and 
state governance have managed well. 
 103.  THE ALEUT CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 20 (2020). 
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small in relation to overall corporate assets.104 There are several reasons 
for this, including management practice and the originally suboptimal tax 
structure. Regarding the latter, after the amendments to ANCSA 
providing for settlement trusts,105 corporate managers may not want to 
reduce the size of their operating businesses to adopt an economically 
meaningfully sized endowment model. Once assets are moved to a 
settlement trust, ANC management cannot use such assets for regular 
corporate investments.106 Settlement trust assets must be invested 
“passively,” that is, invested similar to how an endowment invests via 
diversified investments in the market (not by direct investments in 
operating businesses).107 Regarding tax efficiency, it is the point of view 
of the authors that it was a design flaw of the original ANCSA to not allow 
ANCs to use their original endowment allotment to make distributions to 
settlement trusts or diversified endowment models on a pre-tax basis. The 
taxing of passive investments at the regular corporate rate encouraged an 
operating business model. However, as discussed, operating businesses 
definitionally have additional risk in the form of going concern risk and 
all businesses eventually cease. Originally, all shares in ANCs were also 
to become freely tradable in 1991.108 From the perspective of the Alaska 
Natives who fiercely desire a degree of cultural continuation, the 
amendment to ANCSA that continued restrictions on share marketability 
unless shareholders opt to lift restrictions, was crucial.109 It should be 
noted, no Alaska Native corporation has opted to make its shares publicly 
traded and all Alaska Native corporation shares remain restricted. 
VI. IMPACT OF AN ENDOWMENT MODEL 
In 1988, ANCSA was amended to authorize ANCs to form 
 
 104.  Id. (noting that the Aleut Corporation has $15.8 million in a “Permanent 
Fund” which is 4% of Total Assets of $369.7 million). 
 105.  Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 
100-241, ch. 11, § 10, 101 Stat. 1788, 1804–06 (1988) (codified as amended at 43 
U.S.C. § 1629e (2018)). 
 106.  43 U.S.C. § 1629e(b). 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  43 U.S.C. § 1636 (2018). (“[S]tock issued pursuant to subsection (g) [of this 
Act] . . . shall vest in the holder all rights of a stockholder . . . except that for a 
period of twenty years after the date of enactment of this Act the stock, inchoate 
rights thereto, and any dividends paid or distributions made with respect thereto 
may not be sold, pledged, subjected to a lien or judgment execution, assigned in 
present or future, or otherwise alienated.”). 
 109.  About the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, ANCSA REGIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, https://ancsaregional.com/about-ancsa/# (last visited Mar. 24, 
2021). 
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settlement trusts.110 Settlement trusts are designed “to promote the health, 
education, and welfare of its beneficiaries and preserve the heritage and 
culture of Natives.”111 These purposes are accomplished by ANC placing 
cash, securities, real property, or other assets into the trust.112 Earnings of 
trust assets can then be used to pay benefits to beneficiaries.113 Under 
ANCSA, the settlement trust may define beneficiaries as shareholders, 
Natives, and descendants of Natives.114 Typically, settlement trusts create 
one or more benefit programs for designated beneficiaries to, inter alia, 
create a permanent fund, pay distributions/dividends to shareholders, or 
provide for burials, elder care, scholarships, or other benefits.115 
Settlement trusts, although created and controlled by the settling 
ANC,116 are fundamentally different than the more traditional corporate 
form. For instance, a settlement trust can hold passive investments (e.g., 
securities or an interest in a business) but cannot operate a business.117 A 
settlement trust also may not receive a subsurface estate from the ANC or 
sell timber for general profit,118 or alienate a surface estate received by 
one.119 In short, settlement trusts are designed to be in the mold of passive 
management—akin to an endowment—as opposed to active business 
operators, and therefore are designed to have a different risk profile. 
But perhaps the most important practical difference lies in the tax 
treatment of settlement trusts as compared to corporations for purposes 
of federal income taxes. The 1989 Amendments and later legislation, such 
as the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,120 
created a fairly clear but not overly beneficial tax regime for settlement 
trusts and the settlor ANC. For instance, the tax rates applicable to a 
settlement trust prior to passage of Act of December 22, 2017, (the “2017 
Tax Act”)121 were ten percent on the trust’s ordinary income (e.g., interest 
 
 110.  43 U.S.C. § 1629e (2018). 
 111.  Id. § 1629e(b)(1). 
 112.  Id. § 1629e. 
 113.  Bruce N. Edwards, Understanding and Making the New Section 646 Election 
for Alaska Native Settlement Trusts, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 217, 221 (2001). 
 114.  43 U.S.C. § 1602(t) (“‘Settlement Trust’ means a trust— (1) established and 
registered by a Native Corporation under the laws of the State of Alaska pursuant 
to a resolution of its shareholders, and (2) operated for the benefit of shareholders, 
Natives, and descendants of Natives, in accordance with 43 U.S.C. § 1629e and the 
laws of the State of Alaska.”). 
 115.  Bruce N. Edwards, 2017 Tax Act and Settlement Trusts, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 
1, 11 (2018) [hereinafter 2017 Tax Act]. 
 116.  ANCSA provides the settling Native Corporation power to appoint and 
remove trustees. 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(b)(2). 
 117.  Id. § 1629e(b)(1)(A). 
 118.  Id. §§ 1629e(a)(2), (c)(2). 
 119.  Id. § 1629e(b)(1)(B). 
 120.  Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38. 
 121.  Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054. 
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and rental income), and zero percent on its net qualified gains.122 These 
rates, although favorable to settlement trusts, did not create a strong 
enough tax incentive for ANCs to divert substantial capital from business 
operations to passive savings via a trust.123 Those same taxable rates for 
settlement trusts were left intact in the 2017 Tax Act,124 but contributions 
by ANCs into a settlement trust became substantially more attractive after 
Congress provided those contributions would be made on a tax 
deductible rather than after-tax basis.125 While deductions cannot exceed 
the taxable income of the ANC, unused contributions can be carried 
forward fifteen years.126 Further, beneficiaries will usually not pay taxes 
on distributions received from the trust.127 Thus, after adoption of the 
2017 Tax Act: 
• An ANC can deduct contributions to a settlement trust; 
• The settlement trust pays a one-time ten percent tax on the 
contribution and any future ordinary income, but no taxes on 
capital gains; and 
• In most circumstances beneficiaries will not pay taxes on 
distributions received from the trust. 
This new paradigm has resulted in the creation of many settlement 
trusts and the influx of significant capital into them in the past several 
years.128 In short, for the first time, settlement trusts are broadly 
 
 122.  Edwards, 2017 Tax Act, supra note 115, at 11 (citing I.R.C. §§ 646(b)(2), 1(c), 
(i) (ordinary income) and (b)(2), 1(h)(1)(B) (net capital gain) (2018)). 
 123.  See id. 
 124.  Edwards, 2017 Tax Act, supra note 115, at 16. 
 125.  I.R.C. § 247(a). When non-cash property is contributed, the amount of the 
deduction is the lesser of the ANC’s adjusted basis or the fair market value of the 
property. Id. § 247(b)(2). 
 126.  I.R.C. §§ 247(c)(1), (2). 
 127.  There is a four-tier system for determining the taxability of distributions 
by a settlement trust: 
Tier 1 (tax free): Distributions up to the settlement trust’s taxable income 
Tier 2 (tax free): Distributions up to the settlement trust’s accumulated non-
distributed taxable income 
Tier 3 (taxable): Distributions in excess of the settlement trust’s accumulated 
taxable income, up to the ANC’s retained earnings/net profit 
Tier 4 (tax free): Distributions in excess of the settlement trust’s accumulated 
taxable income and ANC’s retained earnings/net profit 
I.R.C. § 646(e). Consequently, only if distributions exceed the settlement trust’s 
current year or non-distributed taxable income, and the ANC has significant 
retained earnings/net profit, will a distribution be a taxable event to the receiving 
beneficiary. See id. 
 128.  The authors have noted this anecdotally in our work with ANCs. See also 
Jennifer Carroll, What Are ANCSA Settlement Trusts?, DEPARTMENT OF ALASKA 
NATIVE STUDIES AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (Nov. 3, 2018), 
https://dansrd.community.uaf.edu/2018/11/03/what-are-ancsa-settlement-
trusts-researched-and-written-by-jenny-bell-jones-with-input-from-current-and-
former-dansrd-colleagues/ (noting that thirty settlement trusts are in existence by 
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competing with traditional business activities and shareholder dividends 
for ANC capital. Thus, the tax structure offered today by settlement trusts 
makes an endowment model more viable. Endowments have life cycles 
that are more consistent with cultural continuation and fostering a social 
responsibility mission. In fact, Congress stated the reasons for the changes 
were because the current laws “discouraged contributions by Native 
Corporations” to settlement trusts which are “effective tools for reducing 
dependence on state and federal welfare programs in Alaska Native 
communities” and more generally “improve the health, education, and 
welfare of the settlement trusts’ beneficiaries.”129 
ANC assets shifted to settlement trust endowments have the 
advantage of: (1) better long-term risk management consistent with 
cultural continuation; (2) far more tax efficiency; (3) dividend 
diversification via other payments to shareholders; and (4) can be used 
for cultural continuation activities and payments.130 Regarding tax 
efficiency, in the five years prior to 2016, the ANCs’ average net income 
was nearly $20 million per regional ANC and roughly half of that was 
paid out to shareholders in dividends.131 However, that profit figure is 
after tax. Taxes are complicated and depend on individual ANC 
situations, but settlement trusts can allow ninety percent of earnings to 
flow through to shareholders.132 Ignoring net operation losses (NOLs), a 
twenty one percent federal and approximately nine-and-a-half percent 
Alaska state corporate income tax rate is typical for large corporations.133 
ANC taxation is particular to each ANC’s tax situation (some have very 
large built up NOL positions). But generally, settlement trusts are a much 
more efficient tax investment vehicle, with less risk. 
When an ANC moves assets to a settlement trust, such assets are no 
longer a part of the ANCs assets. Assets are in a separate entity and 
 
late 2018, an increase of twenty-two from the eighteen in 1999, i.e., an implied 
creation of twelve in the nine years up to 2018, versus eighteen in the twenty-
seven years to 1999). 
 129.  STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 115TH CONG., RECONCILIATION 
RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO H. CON. RES. 71 (Comm. Print 2017) (“The 
Committee believes that restrictions on the activities and assets of Settlement 
Trusts may discourage contributions by Native Corporations. The Committee 
further believes that Settlement Trusts are effective tools for reducing dependence 
on state and federal welfare programs in Alaska Native communities. More 
generally, the Committee believes that it is desirable to promote the funding of 
Settlement Trusts as a means to improve the health, education, and welfare of the 
Settlement Trusts’ beneficiaries.”). 
 130.  See Edwards, 2017 Tax Act, supra note 115, at 1. 
 131.  Lind, supra note 11. 
 132.  See Edwards, 2017 Tax Act, supra note 115, at 10–12. 
 133.  For Alaska corporate income tax rates, see David M. Steingold, Alaska 
State Business Income Tax, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/alaska-state-business-income-tax.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
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require a level of separate governance as created in the trust. Trustees also 
have clearly defined fiduciary obligations to trust beneficiaries under 
trust law, rather than the less strict fiduciary standards directors owe 
shareholders and the corporation under the Alaska Corporations Code.134 
Also, creation of the trust is expensive and difficult to undo.135 Board and 
shareholder approval are required, and a trust must be registered with 
the state and assets can then be contributed.136 The existence of the trust 
requires conscientious policy and effective governance under State of 
Alaska trust law. 
This is not to say ANCs should abandon other business activities 
altogether. For instance, ANCs have many potential natural resource 
extraction opportunities and other opportunities that will arise as a result 
of their vast undeveloped land and subsurface land rights which 
Congress specifically prohibited from being transferred to settlement 
trusts.137 ANCs will want to continue evaluating the potential 
development of these resources. They will also want to carefully analyze 
current business operations to determine if expected future returns can 
compete with the significantly tax-advantaged passive portfolio 
settlement trusts may hold. 
VII. CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL ENDOWMENT MODELS: 
AN ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CASE STUDY 
There are useful, but not exact, analogies to draw between settlement 
trusts and institutional endowments. Typical examples might be 
charitable trusts or university endowments. For ANCs, the APFC 
provides a useful comparison. That is not just because ANCs and the 
APFC are Alaska-based, but because they share underlying similarities in 
the form of a natural resource base being an important component to at 
least initial economic contribution, opportunities, and risks associated 
with the Alaska economy, demography and politics, and, importantly, a 
shared cultural tradition. To the latter point, it is hard to envision two 
structures that are more unique or economically critical to Alaska than 
ANCs and the APF. 
A brief history of the APF is useful to contextualize the analogy. In 
1968 Atlantic Richfield drilled the first successful exploratory well for oil 
at Prudhoe Bay on Alaska’s North Slope at what turned out to be the 
largest oil field yet discovered in North America.138 The subsequent 
 
 134.  Alaska Stat. § 10.06.450(b) (2018). 
 135.  Alaska Stat. §§ 10.06.605–10.06.678 (2018). 
 136.  43 U.S.C. § 1602(t)(2) (2018). 
 137.  43 U.S.C. § 1629e(a)(2) (2018). 
 138.  For a list and some history about the discovery of large oil fields in the 
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Prudhoe Bay oil and gas lease sale in September of 1969 brought in $900 
million in revenue to the State of Alaska, an amount that was eight times 
larger than that year’s unrestricted state revenue.139 By 1975, the state had 
spent all available funds from leasing bonuses,140 and the delay in the 
construction of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System had meant that 
alternative state revenues were not available to fill in the gap.141 The state 
ultimately negotiated a deal with the large oil companies to borrow 
against future production taxes as bridge funding,142 but the experience 
left many Alaska policymakers leery. One of the authors of this paper has 
often said “the best billion dollars the state ever spent was blowing 
through the initial leasing bonuses” as it brought to the forefront the need 
to preserve some portion of oil revenue wealth. That experience is 
comparable to the economic hardship, and maturation process, numerous 
ANCs had in the 1970–1980s after risky investment of ANCSA settlement 
funds left some close to, or actually in, bankruptcy. 
For the State of Alaska, that history led many of its decision makers 
to support putting a portion of future oil and gas revenues into a 
permanent fund, where they would be out of reach of day-to-day 
government spending to generate income in perpetuity.143 In 1976 the 
people of the state ratified a constitutional amendment establishing the 
APF, whereby at least twenty-five percent of all mineral lease rentals, 
bonuses, sale proceeds and the state share of federal mineral revenue 
sharing payments would be placed into the APF.144 It was further 
constitutionalized that earnings of the APF could be deposited in the state 
general fund, but the principal of those deposits could not be spent by the 
legislature.145 Soon thereafter, the legislature created a statutory regime 
 
United States, see Charles Kennedy, The Top 10 Largest Oil And Gas Fields In The 
United States, OILPRICE.COM (Apr. 7, 2015, 1:33 PM CDT), 
https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Top-10-Largest-Oil-And-
Gas-Fields-In-The-United-States.html. 
 139.  See Univ. of Alaska, Inst., of Soc., Econ. and Gov’t Research, Alaska’s 
Economy in the 1960s, ALASKA REV. BUS. AND ECON. CONDITIONS, Dec. 1970, at 20. 
Page 20 itemizes state taxes and other “Total Unrestricted Revenue” that sum to 
$112 million. 
 140.  Mike Bradner & Tim Bradner, How We Got Here: Recapping the History of 
Alaska’s Permanent Fund, ANCHORAGE PRESS, 
https://www.anchoragepress.com/news/how-we-got-here-recapping-the-
history-of-alaska-s-permanent-fund/article_2df9cb56-9207-11e9-9dd3-
b7cf7f00ad72.html (last updated July 24, 2020). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Alaska Stat. § 43.58 (repealed 1984). 
 143.  History of the Alaska Permanent Fund, ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., 
https://apfc.org/who-we-are/history-of-the-alaska-permanent-fund (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2021). 
 144.  ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 14. 
 145.  Id. 
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whereby approximately fifty percent of earnings of the APF would be 
paid out as dividends on a pro rata basis to citizens of the state, with the 
rest residing in a statutorily created earnings reserves account.146 The 
legislature established that both the “principal” and “earnings reserves” 
accounts were to be managed by the APFC with the mandate to conserve 
a portion of the state’s revenue from mineral resources to, among other 
goals: benefit all generations of Alaskans; maintain safety of principal 
while maximizing total return; and manage savings to allow the 
maximum use of disposable income for the purposes designated by 
law.147 
Although it is easy to critique flaws in the APF model, and there are 
aspects of the structure that could have been designed to more optimally 
increase overall welfare, judging by the widespread support of the APF, 
it was a public policy success.148 The drop of oil prices in 2014 that has 
continued through 2021, in combination with sustained long-term drop 
in oil production from the Alaska North Slope from a high of 2,100,000 
barrels per day in 1988 to 499,000 in 2019, has resulted in a material 
decline in state revenues from oil and gas.149 Although the State of Alaska 
has had well publicized budget shortfalls in recent years,150 it has still 
maintained savings in the two APF accounts of over $78 billion.151 
Income from the state’s natural resource economy, which a decade 
ago was thought to equate to a long future of governmental surpluses,152 
 
 146.  ALASKA STAT. § 37.13.145(b) (2018). 
 147.  Id. § 37.13.020 (2018). 
 148.  See Kate McFarland, ALASKA, US: Survey Shows Support for Permanent 
Fund Dividend Amid Continued Legal Controversy, BASIC INCOME EARTH NETWORK 
(July 10, 2017), https://basicincome.org/news/2017/07/us-survey-shows-
majority-support-for-permanent-fund-dividend-amid-continued-legal-
controversy/ (highlighting a recent phone survey indicating general public 
support for the dividend). 
 149.  Elwood Brehmer, Alaska North Slope Oil Production is About to be at its 
Lowest Fiscal-Year Level Since Pipeline Startup, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (June 28, 
2019), https://www.adn.com/business-economy/energy/2019/06/28/alaska-
north-slope-oil-production-is-about-to-be-at-its-lowest-level-since-startup/. 
 150.  See e.g., James Brooks, As Alaska Deficit Nears $1.3 Billion, Savings Accounts 
are Expected to Run Dry Next Year, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (July 23, 2020), 
https://www.adn.com/politics/alaska-legislature/2020/07/23/as-alaska-
deficit-nears-13-billion-savings-accounts-are-expected-to-run-dry-next-year/ 
(discussing the recent budget shortfalls and the impacts of the resulting deficit). 
 151. The Alaska Permanent Fund Management Corporation has various 
reports on investments. For a recent total sum see https://apfc.org/financial-and-
performance-reports/. 
 152.  See Andrew Kitchenman, Alaska Has Lost a Greater Share of Revenue than 
Most States due to COVID-19, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 3, 2020, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/08/03/895376851/alaska-has-lost-a-greater-share-
of-revenue-than-most-states-due-to-covid-19 (discussing how oil and gas 
revenues used to cover over 100% of the budget but now cover less than a quarter 
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is now unlikely to support even a fraction of governmental spending 
going forward.153 Yet, although Alaska is income poor, it is asset rich due 
to the structured savings mechanism of the APF. The balance of the APF 
has recently been about ten to fifteen times the size of the state’s annual 
operating budget.154 That level of savings is much higher than other 
natural resource economies. Norway, with the largest sovereign wealth 
fund in the world at over $1 trillion, has only budget coverage from its 
fund at around five to six times its annual budget.155 Wyoming, Alberta, 
and Saudi Arabia all have accumulated savings equal to between one to 
three years spending.156 ANCs, most of which derive a substantial portion 
of income from either development of their lands, or revenue sharing 
from other ANCs,157 can learn from that model. Revenue from business 
operation and from natural resource development can decline, for any 
number of reasons, but disciplined savings into a passively managed 
settlement trust can, over time, provide a powerful diversification tool. 
Businesses have a short natural life cycle—sovereign wealth funds, 
endowments, and ANCs can ideally survive and thrive in perpetuity. 
An ANC might create a settlement trust for other reasons. Current 
tax laws make advantageous the creation of a settlement trust simply as 
a pass-through vehicle for dividends with no higher purpose. Settlement 
trusts may legally administer a beneficiary program such as the funding 
of elder payments to original shareholders or to fulfill an economic 
development mandate which, by design, defease over time.158 Settlement 
trusts offer an opportunity for an intergenerational mandate, something 
which the classic corporate model is less suited to accomplish, and which 
definitionally requires the creation of a pool of long-lived investment 
assets (hereinafter referred to as a “permanent fund”). A review of the 
APFC literature surrounding successful endowments and sovereign 
wealth funds show critical elements that allow intergenerational success 
in such permanent funds, many of which translate directly to settlement 
trusts. 
In February of 2020, the APFC published “Trustee Paper Volume 9” 
which analyzed aspects of its peers’ sovereign wealth funds that were 
relevant to the Alaska model that have tended to lead to long-term success 
 
of the budget). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., TRUSTEES’ PAPER, VOL. 9, at 7 (Feb. 2020). 
 155. Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i)(1)(A)–(2)(j) (2018) (noting that seventy per cent of 
revenue is shared among the constituent corporations). 
 158.  Id. § 1606(r). 
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and failure.159 Several of those findings are informative to ANCs that seek 
to create settlement trusts with an objective of intergenerational 
preservation and growth of capital. For instance, the APFC has warned 
against the “three deadly sins” that have undermined sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs) such as the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund over the 
long-term: (1) loss-making development investments,160 (2) ad hoc 
spending out of the fund’s principal; and (3) inadequate saving, including 
limiting or even suspended transfers into the fund or a lack of inflation 
proofing.161 For ANCs to create permanent funds that survive and thrive 
over many decades, trust creators should focus on the importance of 
mission clarity, adherence to a rules-based system, and well-defined 
savings and spending rules. 
A. Mission Clarity as to the Investment Function of the Permanent 
Fund 
Settlement trusts are often created to meet multiple objectives 
beneficial to shareholders and Natives. Those might include a permanent 
fund, payment of distributions/dividends to shareholders, and the 
funding of specific programs designed to benefit classes of shareholders 
or their relatives (e.g., elder or decedent benefits or scholarships). 
Certainly, such programs in the abstract are laudable and have the 
potential to fulfil cultural continuation and valuable social functions. But 
they also create a hazard that the mission clarity around the investment 
function of the settlement trust’s permanent fund will be degraded. 
If a settlement trust has any purpose other than to preserve, grow 
capital, and pay distributions, then its investment management function 
should be separated from other objectives by clearly defined beneficiary 
programs. History has demonstrated that successful long-term 
management of financial assets requires an exclusive focus on the goal of 
investment management.162 
This hazard was a core finding of “APFC Trustee Paper 9.” 
Specifically, the paper discusses examples of SWFs where the goal of 
savings and income generation163 was mixed with other goals such as 
 
 159.  ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., supra note 154. 
 160.  See id. at 10 (describing loss making development investments as 
essentially public spending dressed up as investment). 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  See id. at 11 (providing Norway, New Zealand, Australia, and Chile as 
examples of successful SWFs who have focused an investment management). 
 163. The paper also discussed economic stabilization as a potentially important 
goal of SWFs. Id. at 9. The idea is that under a well-defined rules-based system, a 
SWF will save and release funds to the owning government based on defined 
macro-economic conditions and thus provide economic stabilization particularly 
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mandates for local development, economic diversification and 
infrastructure financing.164 Essentially, there is a substantial risk of these 
alternative social objectives interfering with managing investments for 
long-term returns and resulting in unsystematic and unsustainable use of 
savings for social mandates in the short-term.165 For ANCs, the permanent 
fund program should be managed to maximize long-term returns 
independent of any other settlement trust objectives. That means the 
permanent fund should exist in its own separate fund that is managed 
unrelated and without consideration of the goals of other beneficiary 
programs. Similarly, the most successful SWFs, such as those in Norway, 
New Zealand, Australia, and Chile, devote considerable resources to 
communicating their purposes and goals.166 ANCs should do the same 
with shareholders and trust beneficiaries.167 
B. Adherence to a Rules-Based System for Permanent Funds 
Part and parcel with the need for a permanent fund to have mission 
clarity around a long-term investment mandate is the need to have well-
defined rules around the transfer of funds into and out of the permanent 
fund. In 2018, the APFC Board of Trustees adopted a resolution 
specifically highlighting the need for adherence to a rules-based system, 
pointing out that these systems are a part of the Santiago Principles which 
identify best practices for SWFs.168 
A rules-based system improves the likelihood that the 
Permanent Fund will be sustainable over time. Having a holistic 
 
as related to the budgetary swings associated with commodity prices. This could 
have been a useful purpose of settlement trusts for A NCs. However, ANCSA 
specifically prevents settlement trusts from distributing capital back to the 
corporation which prohibits this function. See 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(b)(1) (noting that 
a settlement trust may not “operate as a business[,]” “alienate land or any interest 
in land” from the ANC, or “discriminate in favor of individuals” associated with 
the ANC). 
 164.  ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., supra note 154, at 9. 
 165.  Id. at 9–11. 
 166.  Id. at 11. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., RESOLUTION 18-01: RESOLUTION OF THE 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORPORATION SUPPORTING 
ADHERENCE TO A RULES BASED LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FUND TRANSFERS (Mar. 2018), 
https://3zi9ys20feru1cmlnv3u4tep-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/2018_01_APFC_Resolution-Rules-Based-System-for-
Fund-Transfers.pdf (internal footnotes omitted) (citing INT’L WORKING GRP. OF 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” at 13 (Oct. 2008), 
https://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/santiagoprinciples_0_0.pdf 
[hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES]). 
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framework rationalized by policymakers regarding the rules for 
savings, withdrawals, and growing the real value of the Fund 
results in a consistent approach to transfers over the long-term. 
This is a core element to ensuring sustainability. Conversely, the 
reliance on ad hoc draws to support government spending 
would substantially increase the chance of a non-sustainable 
withdrawal in any one year and the risk of nonformulaic draws 
compounding in an unsustainable manner over multiple 
years.169 
A binding rules-based framework is often difficult to achieve for 
general governmental savings. For instance, the APF principal is 
constitutionally protected from spending, but nothing prevents the 
legislature from spending some or all of the earnings reserve account ad 
hoc.170 Custom and “good policy” are the tools currently available to 
enforce many of the rules around fund transfers. 
ANCs have an excellent opportunity to adopt binding, long-term 
fiscal rules around their permanent funds. Each settlement trust must 
have a trust agreement, which, if properly created, is difficult to change.171 
The trust agreement should be drafted with careful thought around the 
rules-based system that will be applied to the permanent fund in the trust. 
Specifically, we recommend that the trust agreement: 
• separates the permanent fund from other pools of money and 
beneficiary programs so it is managed on a standalone basis; 
• identifies that the primary priority of the permanent fund is to 
preserve the real value of the principal, which will not be 
diminished over the long-term by distributions, inflation, or 
costs and fees; 
• identifies that the secondary priorities of the permanent fund are 
to manage the permanent fund for long-term returns and stable 
distributions; and 
• has clearly articulated rules as to when distributions may and may 
not be made. 
 
 169.  ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., supra note 168, at 1. 
 170.  ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 15 (providing that the principal of the fund may 
only be used for income-producing investments and income from those 
investments shall be deposited in the general fund unless otherwise provided by 
law); Alaska Stat. § 37.13.145 (2018) (establishing the earnings reserve in which 
the permanent fund is to deposit income from principal and providing formulas 
for the annual transfer of funds from the earning reserve to pay dividends and 
offset the effect of inflation). 
 171.  See 43 U.S.C. § 1629b(a)–(b) (2018) (outlining the basic procedure to 
establish a settlement trust). 
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C. Permanent Fund Savings and Spending Rules 
In the SWF context, perhaps the two most important rules define 
when deposits will be made into (the “savings rule”) and out of (the 
“spending rule”) the fund. If the savings and spending rules are adhered 
to over time, the fund will grow with continued predictable deposits.172 
This will avoid the fund becoming degraded by the government having 
too high of a withdrawal rate or through one-time ad hoc raids.173 
The APF has grown and flourished for over forty years with the 
constitutional rule that twenty five percent of royalties and similar 
payments from mineral development will be deposited into it.174 Yet, in 
many oil-rich economies the absence of a binding savings rule has 
resulted in suboptimal savings during “boom periods,” such as the late 
1970s to early 1980s; and, more recently, the period of steadily rising oil 
prices between 2002 and 2008.175 A lack of a binding savings rules often 
also results in a failure to save in poor financial years.176 
Deposits into settlement trusts are at the discretion of the settling 
ANC and therefore cannot be a rule enforced by the trust. However, 
corporations on behalf of their trusts can establish their own rules, even 
if they are not binding. A key element is consistency over the long term. 
ANCs could adopt rules or guidelines to, for instance, deposit each year 
the amount that takes taxable income to zero (thus optimizing the tax 
savings), a certain percentage of revenues from land development or 
revenue sharing, or even a set amount of net income. 
An alternative savings approach would be to target a desired fund 
size and have the ANC make one or more large contributions early in the 
trust’s life. Although most SWFs are funded through ongoing deposits of 
oil or natural resource revenues, some SWFs—particularly in Asia—have 
been funded by deposits of one-time windfalls such as from privatization 
of previously state-owned infrastructure.177 A reasonable savings rule 
could be a schedule of deposits into the settlement trust over a few years 
to allow distributions of $X per share. Later deposits could be added, but 
the savings rule would target a certain annual dividend that could be 
 
 172.  See generally ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., TRUSTEES’ PAPER, supra note 
154, at 15–18. 
 173.  See id. at 15 (explaining how oil-rich nations, notably Saudi Arabia in 
recent years, have squandered large oil-based windfalls due to unrestricted 
withdrawals). 
 174.  ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 15. 
 175.  ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., TRUSTEES’ PAPER, supra note 154, at 15. 
 176.  Id. at 16. 
 177.  See Javier Santiso, Sovereign Development Funds: Key Financial Actors of the 
Shifting Wealth of Nations 7 (OECD Emerging Markets Network, Oct. 2008) (noting 
that Malaysia’s SWF had been funded through privatization receipts). 
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made in perpetuity (and short-term large deposits of assets would build 
up carryforward net operating losses in the event Congress revisits the 
tax rules). 
Whereas settlement trusts are unlikely to have strongly enforceable 
savings rules, the structure of the trust and trust agreement lends itself to 
strong spending rules. The trust agreement should identify that the 
primary priority of the permanent fund is to preserve the real value of 
principal, which will not be diminished over the long term by 
distributions, inflation, or costs and fees. The secondary priorities are to 
manage for long-term returns and stable distributions. This establishes 
clear guidance for trustees, under well understood trust principles, that 
the fund should be managed to preserve its real value. However, more 
detailed spending rules are also desirable. 
Historically trusts, such as university endowments and American 
state SWFs, provided that the principal of the trust was to be preserved 
and the income could be expended.178 More sophisticated rules often 
developed to require the trust to retain a portion of earnings to offset 
inflation so the real and not just nominal value was preserved (e.g., the 
APF has statutorily required inflation proofing).179 However, starting in 
the 1970s, the introduction of higher-returning but riskier asset classes, 
like equities, into what had largely been income-generating fixed income 
portfolios, resulted in university endowments with spending rules that 
focused not on income-generated but instead on total return over time.180 
If an endowment is invested for maximum total return, only by accident 
will the amount of dividends and interest earned in a given year be 
consistent with the targeted spending amount.181 Further, the need to 
provide a stable source of income should not have a major bearing on 
either the long-term asset allocation decision or the shorter-term decisions 
to sell assets to realize gains to fund a distribution.182 
Many endowments and SWFs have moved to spending rules based 
on a percentage of the market value (POMV) of the fund.183 While ANCs 
can adopt trust principles that establish preservation of the real value of 
the permanent fund as a primary goal, we advise adoption of a specific 
POMV or other detailed spending rules that will preserve the real value 
of the fund and allow additional real growth at a thoughtfully targeted 
 
 178.  ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., TRUSTEES’ PAPER, supra note 154, at 19. 
 179.  Alaska Stat. § 37.13.145(c) (2018) (directing the corporation to transfer to 
the principal of the Alaska Permanent Fund an amount “sufficient to offset the 
effect of inflation” on the principal). 
 180.  ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., TRUSTEES’ PAPER, supra note 154, at 18. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. at 20. 
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level. A POMV draw also gives the asset managers the ability to focus on 
maximizing total returns rather than the composition of returns between 
capital gains, interest and dividends.184 The APF has found that for well-
managed endowments, a POMV spending rate between four to five 
percent should preserve the real value of the fund.185 A POMV draw less 
than that amount will embed real growth, and a greater withdrawal 
percentage creates significant risk that the real value of the fund will 
degrade over time.186 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Every ANC will at some point face insolvency. That is not a 
statement against the efficacy of ANC managements; it is a simple 
statement about the nature of all business viability. Indeed, ANC 
managements have achieved some remarkable successes in securing 
helpful policy for their companies and shareholders. In addition to the 
initial monies and lands received by ANCs as part of ANCSA, 
managements and policymakers enabled ANCs to receive many 
hundreds of millions in additional monies in the form of the sale of net 
operating losses—federal policy that acted as a very large (in relation to 
their capital) effective additional “capital contribution.”187 Other 
companies lobby for preferential tax treatment, but it is rare to see the 
level of benefit ANCs have received which, as a result, created a very 
strong tailwind. Further, ANCs obtained significant benefit through the 
Small Business Act’s business contract bidding process known as “8(a) 
government contracting.”188 The SBA’s 8(a) Business Development 
Program has become an important revenue and profit source for ANCs, 
but there have been periodic calls for significant changes and the possible 
elimination of ANCs in this program.189 Overall, ANCs have been quite 
successful in fostering a beneficial business-political environment. 
Nevertheless, ANCs did not keep up with the average financial success 
of all U.S. companies. An important question over time is whether ANCs 
will be able to maintain this kind of favorable political environment. 
Of course, the stock market is risky too, and if or when ANCs adopt 
endowment models, they need to build diversified portfolios of U.S. and 
 
 184.  Id. at 22. 
 185.  Id. at 12. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  See Colt, supra note 13, at 8 (noting that one ANC sold its tax losses to 
prevent liquidation). 
 188.  See generally Yang, supra note 55 (explaining why ANCs were especially 
positioned to benefit from section 8(a)). 
 189.  Id. 
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foreign stocks and bonds. However, this market (systematic) risk is 
diversified across hundreds, or thousands of individual companies—and 
is much lower than the high going concern (idiosyncratic) risk currently 
incurred by individual ANCs. 
Can ANC shareholders derive the same sort of cultural identification 
by operating these endowment models as their current ANC operating 
company models? The history of the Alaska Permanent Fund and strong 
constituency among Alaskans, including Alaska Natives, suggests the 
answer could be “yes.” Discussion on that question needs to include 
decision factors such as shareholder employment, a survey of endowment 
models as practiced elsewhere, the kinds of spending that endowment 
models can facilitate on culture, and much more. Materially-sized (that is, 
comparable in size to the operating ANC) endowment models are 
something that ANC managements and shareholders ought to discuss. 
The relative size and slow growth of the ANCs’ permanent funds and/or 
settlement trusts compared to their continued commitment to an 
operating business model indicate managements are, on average (some 
notable exceptions notwithstanding), not considering endowment 
models to a large enough degree to materially impact cultural 
continuation outcomes and distributions to shareholders. Operating 
business models are inconsistent with the very long-term life cycle of 
cultures. Endowment models are more consistent in terms of risk and 
longevity and are equally if not more consistent in terms of immediate 
cultural impact. They have much less risk and have experienced a higher 
monetary return than ANC shareholders have. We believe it was an 
unfortunate feature of the original ANCSA to not have facilitated a tax-
efficient endowment model option via settlement trusts. While it is easy 
to second-guess what was accomplished nearly fifty years ago by Alaska 
Native leadership, current shareholders must always keep in mind that 
they obtained a truly historic settlement. Endowment models are an 
incremental structural change with large implications to the original 
ANCSA structure that are much more attainable and less intrusive on the 
lives of existing Alaska Natives than other proposals.190 Today, ANCs can 
adopt an attractive settlement trust vehicle potentially more consistent in 
risk to cultural retention horizons. Even larger scale adoption of 
endowment models via the new settlement trusts are an important option 
ANCs and their shareholders should consider. 
 
 190.  See Hirschfield, supra note 14, at 1354 (noting that ANCSA-incorporated 
villages should receive “quasi-governmental powers over the land they own”); see 
also Vazquez, supra note 14, at 372–73 (describing a proposed bill that would have 
transformed ANCs into benefit corporations (“B Corps”) that may “deviate from 
the profit maximization framework” of corporations). 
